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INTRODUCTION
Failure to warn remains a doctrine in distress. More than two decades ago, we
published an article criticizing the law governing product warnings for being little
more than an "empty shell," allowing claims that need only be asserted rhetorically
to reach the jury.' Afterward we served as reporters for the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)"), helping to write black-letter
rules covering product warnings and a number of other subjects. Working on the
Restatement (Third) project required coming to terms with the similarities and
differences between defective design and failure to warn.2 One important difference
* Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
** James A. Henderson Jr., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Emeritus, Cornell
Law School.
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1. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990). The article
was well received. See Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential Articles, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2000) (recognizing the aforementioned article as one of the
twenty-five most influential articles published by the New York University Law Review over
the last seventy-five years).
2. In design cases, for example, it is no defense that the danger presented by the
product is open and obvious; if an obvious danger can be avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design, the product may be defective. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998); see also, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d
571, 575 (N.Y. 1976). Where a claim is based on failure to warn, the claim fails if the danger
presented by the product is open and obvious because the product's obvious danger serves as a
warning. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998); see also, e.g.,
Weiner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 718 A.2d 305, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Furthermore,
"when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out
of a product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant
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relates to what the plaintiff must prove to establish a product defect. Regarding
design-based liability, except for designs that are manifestly self-defeating3 or that fail
to conform to valid safety regulations,4 most American courts require plaintiffs to
prove that (1) a specifically identified reasonable alternative design (RAD) was
available at the time of commercial distribution, (2) failure to adopt the RAD rendered
the design not reasonably safe, and (3) adoption of the RAD would have reduced or
prevented the plaintiffs harm.5 Regarding alleged failures to warn, many courts
impose no parallel burdens on the plaintiff; in those jurisdictions, the plaintiff need
only assert in conclusory fashion that the defendant's warnings of nonobvious
product-related risks were inadequate, without specifyring exactly what warning the
defendant should have given or proving that a different warning would have done any
good.6
The Restatement (Third) reflects this important difference by requiring a
specifically identifiable RAD in its black-letter rule governing design while
imposing no parallel requirement in connection with warning claims. With regard
to failure to warn, neither the Restatement (Third) black letter nor the official
comments explicitly require that the plaintiff articulate a reasonable alternative
warning (RAW) in order to establish a prima facie case.8 Two reasons help to
explain this difference in treatment. First, as will be discussed in Part II, much of
the case law in the 1980s and '90s did not appear to impose a RAW requirement in
connection with warnings. And second, in many failure-to-warn cases the
residuum of such risks." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1 (1998); see
also, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex. 1998).
3. Such self-defeating defects do not require the plaintiff to proffer a reasonable
alternative design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2 cmt. b (1998); JAMES
A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 189-
91 (7th ed. 2011); see also Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and
Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 807 (2009).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998).
5. See David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 927, 931 (2009)
(recognizing that most jurisdictions require "only that manufacturers design their products as
safe as they are reasonably able to do"); Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74
BROOK. L. REv. 1061, 1079-93 (2009) (surveying all jurisdictions and finding that an
overwhelming majority require a showing of RAD).
6. See infra Part II.
7. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (referring to
"the adoption of a reasonable alternative design" that would have reduced or avoided "the
foreseeable risks of harm"), with id. § 2(c) (referring to "reasonable instructions or
warnings" that could have "reduced or avoided" the "foreseeable risks of harm"). Although
section 2(c) could be interpreted as imposing a RAW requirement, interpreting the absence
of the word "alternative" in light of the official comments to section 2(c) would allow a court
to focus on the shortcomings of the actual warnings without necessarily considering the
specifics ofa better alternative. See infra note 8.
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998) (indicating that
the "plaintiff must prove that adequate instructions or warnings were not provided"). Not
only is this instruction compatible with the plaintiff not suggesting a RAW, but the same
comment may be seen implicitly to denigrate the notion of the plaintiff offering a RAW
when it asserts that "the ability of a plaintiff to imagine a hypothetical better warning ...
does not establish that the warning actually accompanying the product was inadequate." Id.
238 [Vol. 90:237
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defendant's marketing scheme provides no actual warning to which the plaintiffs
proposed warning could be said to be an "alternative." All products are distributed
with designs, but not all products are distributed with warnings. Thus it seemed to
us and our advisers awkward to invoke the concept of an "alternative warning" as
was done in connection with allegedly inadequate designs.9 For these reasons
coupled with an underestimation of the stakes involved, the Restatement (Third)
black-letter law and comments provide a less rigorous test for failure to warn than
for defective design and allow courts to decide whether the plaintiff must specify
what, by way of a more adequate instruction or warning about product-related
risks, the defendant should have communicated to those who manage the relevant
risks. Courts might have developed the concept of a RAW without explicit support
from the Restatement (Third), and some have done so.' 0 But most have not."
As this Article will explain, we now conclude that the same rigor necessary for
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie design defect case should be required for
alleged failures to warn. The plaintiff asserting a warning claim should be required
to specify (by suggesting a RAW) exactly how the defendant or a predecessor in the
distributive chain should have effectively communicated product-related risks, and
to prove (subject to an appropriately adjusted version of the heeding presumption)1 2
how the RAW would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff s harm. From a broader
perspective (perhaps aided and abetted by our earlier work), too much has been
made of the differences between design and warning, and not enough has been made
of their similarities. This Article aims to set things right. Part I establishes the
conceptual groundwork for this adjustment in perspective. It explains how,
notwithstanding some interesting differences, design and warning claims share very
similar foundations. Part II demonstrates that the failure to provide a RAW has
resulted in the imposition of liability without proof of causation. Part III discusses
cases that actually require a RAW. Part IV sets forth our proposal for a RAW.
I. DESIGN AND WARNING CLAIMS SHARE THE SAME FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENTS
The objective here is to describe the basic elements that product design and
warning claims share and explain how those elements serve similar risk-reduction
functions. This analysis is essentially descriptive; it does not attempt to connect risk
reduction with overarching normative goals, such as efficiency or fairness. It
assumes that others have made or will make those connections and is content to
demonstrate that both design and warning claims, rooted in generic product risks,
share similar elements that function similarly in reaching the same risk-reduction
ends.1 3 Based on this demonstration, the analysis concludes that the legal doctrines
9. In drafting the Restatement (Third), the American Law Institute appointed an
official group of advisers drawn from plaintiff and defense bar, the judiciary, and law
professors with expertise in the field of products liability. They met regularly with the
reporters and reviewed all section and comment drafts. For a list of these reporters and
advisers, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., at v (1998).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
13. This instrumental commitment to risk reduction does not mean that products liability
2392015]
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governing both design and warning claims should, based on their shared internal
logic, be treated in basically the same fashion. As this Article will make clear, the
earlier analyses of the practical differences between design and warning litigation
remain valid, but the failure of those analyses to adequately acknowledge the
theoretical, foundational similarities, and thus the legitimacy of a RAW
requirement, must be corrected. Manufacturing defects are not considered in this
analysis because they do not involve generic risks; while remedies for such defects
aim toward risk reduction, they do so by taking a different path that calls for
different doctrinal treatment. 14 And proximate causation is similarly omitted; it is
an element shared by all tort claims and sheds no light on a comparison between
product design and failure to warn.' 5
A. An Overview ofLiability for Generic Product Risks: The Building Blocks
ofDefect and Actual Causation
Both design and warning claims are premised on the primary building-block
concept of the untaken precaution-a generic safety feature that, when omitted by the
commercial product distributor, renders the product not reasonably safe.' 6 In the
products liability context, the omitted safety feature is a hypothetical adjustment in
the product actually distributed-a marginally safer design or better warning that the
plaintiff insists should have been adopted by the distributor or a predecessor. 7 It does
not include an entirely different category of product that might have been substituted
for the product distributed by the defendant.' 8 The concept of the untaken precaution
originated in negligence law,' 9 but it is equally relevant under strict liability as the
doctrinal basis of liability for generic product defects. 20 The point here is simply that,
necessarily reflects the ultimate goal of achieving allocative efficiency. Even if the ultimate
goal were achieving fairness or justice, risk reduction could be a means of achieving those
noninstrumental goals. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50
UCLA L. REv. 621, 629 (2002) (suggesting that instrumental means are compatible with
noninstrumental ends as long as they are conceptually sequenced so that the former give way
when the two come into conflict).
14. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC
ANALYSIS 68-75 (1970) (explaining how imposing strict liability for harm caused by
manufacturing defects achieves "general" or market deterrence whereby, once defect-related
accident costs are shifted to commercial product distributors, marketplace competition
pressures distributors to achieve optimal levels of both quality control and production).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 (1998) (taking no specific
position on causation in products liability cases, but referring generally to prevailing rules
and principles governing causation in tort).
16. See generally Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989)
(suggesting that the untaken precaution is the central concept of negligence law).
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. American courts do not impose tort liability based on unreasonably unsafe
categories of products. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing
the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1991).
19. See generally Grady, supra note 16.
20. Although many courts purport to impose "strict liability" for generic product defects,
the defects are determined by an essentially fault-based analysis. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
240 [Vol. 90:237
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in connection with both design and warning claims under either negligence or strict
liability, the plaintiff must establish that a safety feature that the defendant could have
and should have adopted was omitted, thereby causing the product to be not
reasonably safe. Historically, courts have chosen to distinguish between design and
marketing defecis, and we certainly have no quarrel with that choice.2 1 The
conceptual distinction between mechanical defects and generic hazards is critical; but
we now believe that too much has been made of the difference between design and
failure to warn. Courts might have enhanced conceptual clarity by treating design and
warning as subsets of a single concept of "generic defect." 22
The second basic building block in products liability is actual causation. 23
Assuming that the plaintiff shows that the defendant or a predecessor should have
adopted a particular generic safety feature, the plaintiff must also show that
adoption of the feature would have made a difference-that it would have avoided
part or all of the plaintiffs harm. This element of actual causation divides into two
sub-elements. Regarding the first of these sub-elements of causation (general
causation), the safety feature proffered by the plaintiff must reduce the relevant
risks of harm by changing the circumstances affecting would-be victims, which
may include the behavior of persons who control the relevant risks.24 In virtually all
cases other than those involving the systemic effects of drugs and other toxics-in all
cases, for example, involving the traumatic effects of tangible products-this
sub-element of general causation is not an issue.25 Once an omitted aspect of the
product design or marketing of a tangible product qualifies as an untaken precaution,
it must by definition be inherently capable of reducing the relevant risks of harm.
Regarding the second sub-element of actual causation, commonly referred to as
"specific causation," the plaintiff must show that if the product distributor had adopted
the hypothetical precaution, it would have prevented the relevant risks from
materializing in harm to the particular plaintiff.26 This second sub-element is far more
likely to be an issue than the first. Even if an untaken precaution would have reduced
the relevant risks as a general matter, thereby satisfying the requirement of general
causation, it may not have helped a particular plaintiff. In cases involving the traumatic
effects of tangible products, these two sub-elements of actual causation tend to
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998) (indicating that an approach under RAD analysis "is
also used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence").
21. Indeed, the authors embraced this distinction in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
22. Design and failure to warn would have been important subsets. As suggested earlier,
manufacturing defects are not generic but rather exist in individual product units. See
HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at ix (organizing the topics of manufacturing defects
and generic product risks in separate parts, the latter of which contains separate chapters
covering design and warnings).
23. See id. at 154-67; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 11.1 at 732 n. 17
(2005).
24. A proffered safety feature may affect the circumstances of product use by either
building into the design a tangible, harm-avoidance measure or helping, by warnings or
otherwise, to induce safer behavior on the parts of product users, consumers, and others who
are in positions to reduce risks. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 171-80.
25. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, THE
TORTS PROCESS 110-11 (8th ed. 2012).
26. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 126-27.
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collapse into a single "but for the lack of the safety feature" element. But in many
cases involving chemically induced systemic harms, distinguishing between general
risk reduction and the prevention of particular harm improves analytical clarity.27
B. The Building Blocks in Action: Design and Warning Claims Are More Similar
Than They Might at First Appear
1. The Element of Product Defect
As we made clear more than twenty years ago, untaken precautions in the form
of omitted safety features in design-defect litigation typically call for expert
application of the applied sciences and are relatively costly to implement.28 Thus,
when the plaintiff claims that the defendant manufacturer's motor vehicle should
have been designed to include features that would give occupants a greater chance
to survive high-speed collisions, both the cost of engineering the new risk-reducing
design and the cost of prosecuting the claim in court are likely to be substantial.29
Regarding the design features that the plaintiff insists should have been included,
American courts require the plaintiff to prove with considerable exactness what the
features are, how they would function to reduce risks of harm, and why the overall
reductions in risks justify the costs of incorporating the safety features. 30 Only in
the relatively rare circumstance when a product design fails dangerously to perform
its manifestly intended function-only when the design could be said to be
"self-defeating" 3 I-are the costs of untaken precautions likely to be modestly low.
Compared with claims of unsafe design, claims that the marketing of the product
was unreasonably unsafe often rely on untaken precautions that are significantly
less costly for product manufacturers to implement. After all, how great could be
the marginal costs of adding a few attention-grabbing verbal modifiers and an
exclamation point or two? Although adding cautionary language to a marketing
communication may on first encounter appear to be a relatively low-cost safety
feature, it is fallacious to go so far as to say that warnings are by their nature
practically cost free.32 Adding warnings and instructions may generate a variety of
increased delivery costs3 3 and may cause the aggregate informational package to
27. See, e.g., King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 34 (Neb. 2009).
28. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 293.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998) (reflecting
concern for the costs of expert testimony by explicitly recognizing that neither experts nor
prototypes are required in all cases).
30. See id. § 2 cmt. d (stating "[s]ubsection (b) adopts a reasonableness ('risk-utility
balancing') test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs"); see also,
e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); Timpte Indus., Inc.
v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009).
31. See supra note 3.
32. See, e.g., Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the idea that additional warnings are "virtually cost free"); Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 1, at 292-94.
33. See, e.g., Williams v. Super Trucks, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1210 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that a warning could not be attached to a crankshaft); Broussard v. Cont'l Oil Co.,
[Vol. 90:237242
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exceed the capacities of foreseeable consumers to understand and respond
effectively.34 Moreover, variables such as how an adequate warning should have
described the risk, the size and prominence of the warning, and the means by which
the warning should have been communicated (e.g., verbal or pictorial, on the
product or in a user's manual) are crucial in deciding whether the warning proposed
by the plaintiff would have been practically useful and worth its costs. Other
product-related risks of equal or even greater magnitude may have also deserved
warnings, which may have presented logistical difficulties as well as corresponding
increases in costs and decreases in effectiveness. 35 At the extreme, giving a
multiplicity of warnings may lead consumers to disregard all of them.36 In the latter
circumstance, the costs of additional warnings could be very great indeed.
A caveat is in order. Even if increasing the scope or intensity of warnings is
more costly than it might at first be assumed, supplying alternative product
warnings is less costly than supplying alternative product designs in one important
respect. The authors have explained elsewhere how the elements of product design
are inescapably interdependent, such that changing one element usually creates
ripple effects throughout many other elements and thus requires a rearrangement of
essentially the entire design.3 7 The same implications are less likely to occur in
connection with proposed changes in product warnings. The question of whether
the marketing of a product might have included the identification of an additional
risk or risk avoidance measure, or greater emphasis on certain risk information, is
less likely to produce the sorts of ripple effects that create difficulties for courts. 38
Given that a large majority of courts impose a RAD requirement in connection
with design defects,39 it is interesting that most courts have not traditionally
required plaintiffs to assert a RAW-to specify exactly what the product distributor
should have communicated by way of greater risk information. 40 Requiring a RAD
in design litigation sharpens the in-court analysis of what it would cost to make a
design safer and whether it would have been worth those costs to make a design
433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that additional warnings would not fit on the
handle of an electric drill).
34. See generally A.D. Twerski, A.S. Weinstein, W.A. Donaher & H.R. Piehler, The
Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age,
61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 513-17 (1976). For a review of the social science literature that
examines the efficacy of warnings and the variables that may affect end-user decisions as to
how to use a product, see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of
Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-To-Warn Litigation, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 125, 132-36
(2010); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) ("Meaningful
disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between 'competing
considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the need to avoid . . . [informational
overload]."' (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
35. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1540 (1973); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Commentary, Stargazing: The Future of American
Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1335 & nn.18-20 (1991).
38. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 293.
39. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part 11.
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safe enough to have reduced or prevented the plaintiffs harm. Would requiring the
plaintiff to specify a RAW in failure-to-wam litigation similarly affect a court's
cost-benefit assessment of whether the product distributor should have provided
greater marketing safeguards? We submit that this might well be the case inasmuch
as a "spell it out in detail" requirement would help to highlight the delivery costs
and cognitive-overload considerations described earlier.4 1 Without a RAW
requirement, the plaintiff is more likely to be able to have it both ways-to play up
the need for a more forceful warning in the abstract while playing down or ignoring
altogether the sorts of real-life costs, monetary and nonmonetary, that requiring
more forceful warnings would generate. Plaintiffs cannot so easily play that sort of
shell game with claims of bad design given the widespread requirement that the
plaintiff establish a RAD.42 Requiring a RAW might have much the same effects in
connection with claims of defective product marketing.
Admittedly, requiring a RAW implies a measure of arbitrariness that requiring a
RAD does not. Thus, a number (often a large number) of warning variations are
typically available to product distributors by which to communicate information
about a given risk, which is less likely to be the case in connection with design
alternatives.43 It may seem to follow that requiring the plaintiff to choose one among
an apparently large number of equally effective warning variations is arbitrary in a
way that requiring a RAD is not." But such is not the case. Requiring the plaintiff to
identify specifically what, how, and to whom the defendant-distributor should have
communicated additional risk information quite legitimately contributes to achieving
a more sensible, realistic assessment of the costs and benefits associated with
providing allegedly better warnings. Not only would a RAW help to highlight the
costs associated with a better warning,45 but a RAW would also help to reveal any
weaknesses in the plaintiff s claim of but-for causation.46
2. The Element of General Causation
The first of the two elements of actual causation-whether inclusion of the
additional safety feature proffered by the plaintiff would have reduced the risks of
harm to those in the plaintiff's position-is clear in most instances. 47 Assuming that
the plaintiff has established that an omitted precaution should have been included
in the design or marketing of the product, by definition the plaintiff will have
41. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43. Given that the plaintiff may not offer a RAD in the form of a different product category,
see supra note 18 and accompanying text, typically there are only a limited number of ways to
adjust the defendant's product marginally so as to have prevented or reduced the plaintiffs harm.
Regarding alternative warning claims, by contrast, the plaintiff may construct a wide range of
better warnings, constrained only by common sense and the meaning of language.
44. With regard to a RAD, the plaintiffs choices are obviously constrained by the
existing design-there are only a limited number of ways that defendant's design may be
marginally adjusted. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
46. See infra text accompanying note 56.
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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established that such inclusion would have reduced the relevant risks. The only
exceptions involve harms caused systemically (rather than traumatically) by drugs,
toxics, and other chemical compounds where, even if a given chemical should have
been safer as a general proposition, it may be scientifically unclear whether the
compound is capable of causing the sort of harm suffered by the plaintiff.
In those cases, general causation is often a separately contested issue.48
Interestingly, cases involving drugs and toxics are almost always brought by
plaintiffs on the basis of alleged failures to warn. 49 Thus, it is a fair assessment that
general causation is an issue that, when it arises, almost always involves alleged
failures to warn rather than defective designs.
3. The Element of Specific Causation
The second of the two elements of actual causation concerns whether inclusion
of the risk-reducing safety feature proffered by the plaintiff would have prevented
part or all of the particular plaintiffs harm. Regarding design claims, the RAD
proposed by the plaintiff may work to reduce or prevent harm without
risk-reducing inputs from human actors such as persons using the product or
bystanders exposed to harm as a consequence of product usage. Thus, a RAD may
function to render a vehicle design more crashworthy without relying on drivers or
would-be crash victims cooperating in any way.5 0 In that instance, the issue of
specific causation would be whether, on the facts of the particular case, the added
design safety provided by the RAD would have prevented the plaintiffs harm. Of
course, post-distribution cooperation from a risk manager (e.g., a user or consumer
of the product) may be a necessary component of a plausible design-based scheme
to prevent harm, as when a seat belt requires vehicle occupants to "buckle up."5 '
Regarding such design features, the plaintiff must show not only that the safety
feature, once put in play, would have prevented harm, but also that a risk manager
would have put the feature in play. To be sure, supplying seat belts in a vehicle
reduces the risks of accident-related harm by offering buckle-up options; but
passive passenger restraints such as air bags are thought to be more effective
precisely because they function to prevent harm even when would-be accident
victims are passively noncooperative. 52 In effect, RADs that reduce risk without
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. a (1998) (explaining that
courts traditionally have imposed liability for generic risks of prescription drugs only in cases
involving failures to wam). A recent trend favoring design-based liability for drug design rests
on a fairly narrow rule. See id. § 6(c). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Essay, Drug Designs Are Diferent, 111 YALE L.J. 151 (2001). Liability for generic
risks inherent in chemicals and other toxic raw materials is also traditionally based exclusively
on failure to warn. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. c (1998).
50. Crash victims may contribute to risk reduction by avoiding crashes, but that sort of
contribution does not render the vehicle design more crashworthy.
51. Threatening would-be victims with barriers to recovery based on contributory
negligence and assumption of risk pressures them to cooperate. And pressuring defendant
product sellers with liability based on failures to instruct and warn helps encourage cooperation.
52. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 876-81 (2000) (discussing the history
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requiring the post-distribution cooperation of human beings paternalistically
impose increased safety on would-be victims whether or not they like it or are even
aware that risk reduction is happening.
Regarding proposed safety features that consist of omitted warnings about
product-related risks, altering the conduct of those to whom the warnings are
addressed is always a necessary element of the harm-prevention scenario; increased
safety from better product marketing can never be automatic or "forced," as is often
possible by the adoption of a safer product design. Thus, every failure-to-warn
claim rests on an assertion by the plaintiff that, as with a seat belt that must be
buckled to be effective, if the product distributor had supplied a more adequate
warning, the person in control of the risk would have responded cooperatively and
the response would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff. It
follows that just as air bags are, in a manner of speaking, preferable to seat belts
because passive, designed-in restraints leave less opportunity for vehicle occupants
willfully or inadvertently to expose themselves to risks of harm, design
modifications, all else being equal, are preferable to marketing modifications from
the standpoint of increasing product safety.54
In asserting a warning claim, the plaintiff must establish specific causation by
showing that reasonable product marketing would have reduced or prevented his
harm.5 5 Requiring the plaintiff to identify a RAW-to specify what the defendant
should have issued by way of an adequate warning-would add to the clarity of the
analysis necessary to determine but-for specific causation. Quite simply, proof of a
RAW would allow the tribunal to compare the specifics of the RAW against the
specifics of the actual marketing of the defendant's product, instead of trying to intuit
its way to a conclusion regarding specific causation based on vague allegations that
some sort of unspecified warnings would have actually prevented the plaintiffs
harm.56 Answering the question of whether the addressee of a particular RAW would
have responded cooperatively in an effort to prevent the plaintiff's harm is inherently
speculative, especially when the addressee is not available as a witness. Therefore,
it would be appropriate for courts to recognize a presumption that a RAW would
have made a difference, subject to rebuttal based on direct or circumstantial
evidence.5 8 Such a presumption would be available only in connection with specific
causation; it would make no sense in the context of general causation.59
of how automobile airbag regulations phased in passive restraints as preferable over seat belts).
53. Of course, air bags are not meant to replace seat belts; both are necessary to provide
maximum protection in case of a crash. Yet unlike seat belts, air bags do not require the
cooperation of the passenger to attain greater safety.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1 (1998) (suggesting
that a safer design is preferable over a warning that leaves significant residuum of risk).
55. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 396-99.
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Requiring a RAW would force plaintiffs to
be more careful about selecting better warnings that would have prevented the harms in question.
57. This would be true when the addressee is either killed or severely disabled.
58. This is commonly referred to as the "heeding presumption." The first case to adopt a
heeding presumption was Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.
1972). Other states have followed suit. See, e.g., Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First
Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d
974 (Ind. 1976); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 720 (N.J. 1993); Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532
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C. A Brief Summary: Some Differences Between Design and Warning Claims
Matter More Than Others
The foregoing analysis supports the conclusion that, notwithstanding the
important practical differences identified elsewhere, 60 design and warning defects
comprise the same basic components functioning in essentially similar fashion:
untaken precautions that would have increased the safety of product use and
consumption and reduced or even prevented the plaintiffs' harm. Many design
precautions are-as all warning precautions are not-capable of reducing risks of
harm without any cooperation on the part of users, consumers, or other risk
managers. But besides supporting a general preference for reducing product risks
by modifying designs rather than increasing warnings,6 1 this difference has no
fundamental consequences relevant to this Article's analysis. Nor does the fact that
general causation traditionally arises only in the context of failure to warn.62 These
differences support the notion that it is useful to maintain the traditional distinction
between design and warning. But these differences do not justify imposing
significantly different burdens on plaintiffs when establishing the centrally
important element of product defect. Thus, based on this Article's analysis, the
same tort liability regime that requires a plaintiff in a design case to identify and
prove a RAD should require the plaintiff in a warning case to identify and prove a
RAW. The authors arguably should have built such a requirement into their earlier
article and into the Restatement (Third), for which they served as reporters. The
Restatement (Third) is consistent with a RAW requirement, but does not explicitly
impose one. 63 In any event, three tasks remain to be accomplished in the present
endeavor: first, to use selected products liability decisions to demonstrate how a
RAW requirement could improve failure-to-warn litigation; second, to identify case
law that supports requiring the plaintiff to establish a RAW; and third, to describe
what a RAW requirement should look like going forward.
P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974). Several jurisdictions, however, have refused to adopt a
heeding presumption. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Merck & Co., No. CV 06-02208 MRP (JTLx),
2007 WL 5861354, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007) (stating that no California court has
adopted the heeding presumption); Lord v. Sigueiros, No. CV 040243, 2006 WL 1510408, at
*3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006); Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200
(Mont. 1993); Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 209 P.3d 271, 274-75 (Nev. 2009). Although the
authors have expressed displeasure with the heeding presumption, see Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 1, at 325-26, the thrust of this Article is that even with the presumption
the plaintiff is still required to proffer a RAW.
59. General causation rests not on what a particular addressee would have done but on
broader rules of physical science, which apply regardless of individual idiosyncrasies.
60. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 292-311.
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1(1998).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
63. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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II. DECIDED CASES Do NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF A RAW: IMPOSING LIABILITY
WITHOUT PROOF OF SPECIFIC CAUSATION
From the onset of failure-to-warn litigation until quite recently, courts did not
require the plaintiff to prove a RAW.64 To be sure, plaintiffs during this period
often appear to have suggested warnings that defendants should have given
attendant to the sale of their products,65 but courts have not required the kind of
specificity that we have suggested in this Article.66 The focus for most courts has
been the inadequacy of the warning given by the defendant; juries have been
permitted to find causation based on their intuition that some undefined warning
would have been read and heeded. Had the plaintiffs been required to set out a
RAW with greater specificity, it is more likely that the defendants would have been
granted judgment as a matter of law.68 Rather than focus on the size, placement,
and intensity of an alternative warning, the plaintiffs were allowed to posit that
some warning would have changed their behavior.69
A much-cited early case illustrates how the traditional approach tended to
eliminate any requirement of specific causation. In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 70 the
plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old girl, was visiting with friends on a warm summer
night. After listening to music for a while, the group became bored.n With nothing
better to do, the girls turned their attention to a Christmas-tree-shaped candle that
was positioned on a shelf behind the couch in the clubroom.72 The youngsters
began to discuss whether the candle was scented. After agreeing that it was not,
one of the plaintiffs friends said "Let's make it scented." 74 She grabbed a drip
bottle of Tigress cologne manufactured by Faberge and began to pour its contents
onto the candle somewhat below the flame. A burst of fire shot out from the
candle, burning the plaintiffs neck and breast.76 A jury found for the plaintiff and
awarded her substantial damages. The trial judge granted Faberge's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict,7 8 which was subsequently upheld by an
intermediate Maryland appellate court.7 9 On appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court
64. To determine whether courts required a "reasonable alternative warning," we searched
both WestlawNext and Lexis Advance using "alternat!/2warn!/p 'failure to wam' as the basis
of our search. The query was run in the database containing all state and federal cases. The
search was limited to opinions written between January 1, 1970, and December 31, 1999.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 70-110.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 70-110.
67. See infra note 110.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 70-110.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 70-110.
70. 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975), rev'g 313 A.2d 527 (1974).
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at n.2.
78. Id.
79. Moran v. Williams, 313 A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974), rev'd, 332 A.2d 11
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reversed and reinstated the jury's finding that Faberge had knowledge that cologne
was a dangerous combustible product and that it was foreseeable that it might cause
a fire.8 0 Tigress cologne had been accident-free for twenty-seven years. The
vapors from the cologne become flammable only when positioned within
one-quarter inch of an open flame.82
The Maryland high court focused almost exclusively on the foreseeability of the
cologne's flammability.8 3 No one proposed a specific warning; the plaintiff simply
argued that there was no warning that the cologne was flammable. But what should the
warning have said and how emphatic should the warning have been? Should it have
been a four-inch warning in blazing red that said "WARNING: COLOGNE IS
FLAMMABLE"? Or should the warning have been written in smaller letters stating
that cologne is flammable when brought within one-quarter inch of a flame? To create
the impression that there was a huge danger of flammability from use of a drip bottle
of cologne would have been a gross overstatement of the flammability of cologne. On
the other hand, a warning written in smaller letters that cologne is flammable only
when brought within one-quarter inch of a flame is less likely to be read or heeded.
The plaintiff might have admitted that neither she nor her friend read the label but
merely glanced at it before dousing the candle with the cologne. The plaintiff escaped
these difficult specific causation questions because she did not have to propose a
RAW. In any event, these considerations were lost on the Maryland Supreme Court.
The judicial intuition that some unarticulated warning would have prevented her injury
was, in the court's view, sufficient to support a finding of causation.
The failure of the plaintiff to set forth a RAW as part of his prima facie case was
even more egregious in Liriano v. Hobart Corp.84  The plaintiff, a
seventeen-year-old immigrant from the Dominican Republic, was injured while
operating a Hobart meat grinder in a supermarket. The grinder was thirty years
old and was originally equipped with a barrier guard permanently riveted onto the
part of the machine in which meat was placed. The guard permitted small pieces
of meat to enter the machine for grinding but protected the user from pushing his or
her hand down toward the grinding mechanism.8 7 Shortly before the accident an
(Md. 1975).
80. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d at 21.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 16-21.
84. 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999). The facts of Liriano v. Hobart Corp., summarized in
the text, are fully expounded in Brief of Defendant, 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998) (Nos.
96-96441L & 97-7449), 1998 WL 34152546, at *2-5. It should be noted that Liriano v.
Hobart Corp. had been litigated before the Second Circuit once before. Liriano v. Hobart
Corp. (Liriano 1), 132 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998). In Liriano I, the circuit certified to the New
York Court of Appeals the question whether a manufacturer had a postsale duty to warn
when there had been a substantial modification of the product that would have precluded
liability for design defect. Id. The New York Court of Appeals answered that question in the
affirmative, Liriano v. Hobart Corp. (Liriano 11), 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998), and remanded
the case to the Second Circuit to decide whether the verdict for the plaintiff based on failure
to wam should be upheld.
85. Brief of Defendant, supra note 84, at *2.
86. Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 125.
87. Id.
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employee of the supermarket sawed off the safety guard. The plaintiff, while
feeding meat into the grinder, placed his hand so that it became enmeshed with the
"grinding worm," resulting in the amputation of his right hand and forearm.8 9
The case was tried in federal district court solely on the ground that Hobart had
knowledge that, over the years, other employers had removed similar safety guards
on other machines and that Hobart failed to provide a postsale warning of the
dangers of operating the grinder without a safety guard.90 The jury found for the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed the judgment to the Second Circuit.91
Speaking for the majority, Judge Calabresi found that even if the danger were
obvious (and thus not requiring a warning to the effect that injury might occur),92
Hobart had a duty to warn employees that they need not accept the risks of using
unguarded grinders.9 3 At no point in the court's decision is there any discussion of
the text of such a warning and where it should have been placed. It was enough that
there was a failure to warn. However, the failure to specify the text and desired
placement of a warning was crucial to resolving the causation issue. Would a
warning that the employee need not accept the risks of an unguarded grinder have
made a difference in this case? The plaintiff understood and read very little English
at the time of the accident.94 Should the warning have been multilingual on every
Hobart grinder? Was it possible to communicate the desired warning through the
use of a pictorial? We doubt that a court forced to respond to these issues would
have found adequate evidence of but-for causation.95 It was altogether too easy to
move from a finding of inadequate warning to an intuitive finding of causation
because the court did not deem it necessary to specify a RAW.
Saladino v. Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc.96 is another example where the
court found it unnecessary for the plaintiff to specify a RAW, resulting in a
questionable finding of specific causation. The plaintiff in Saladino was rendered a
quadriplegic when a baggage tractor in which he was sitting approached an aircraft
that was conducting an engine test.9 7 Jet wash from the engine caused the tractor's
hood to lift up and strike the plaintiff in the head. The plaintiff brought an action
against the manufacturer of the tractor for both design defect and failure to warn.99
Prior to the accident, the tractor had been taken out of commission because four
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 269 & n.4.
93. Id. at 271.
94. Brief of Defendant, supra note 84, at *2.
95. Judge Calabresi relied on a heeding presumption to conclude that causation was
established. However, without establishing what the warning should have said, one cannot
properly conclude that causation has been established. The court's statement that the burden
fell on the defendant to prove that the failure to warn was not the cause of the injury rings
hollow. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d at 271. The defendant could not rebut the
presumption without knowing the nature of the warning that the plaintiff proposed.
96. No. 01-CV-7644 (SLT)(JMA), 2007 WL 4285377 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007).
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *4-11.
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components that would have prevented the plaintiffs injury had been removed. 00
The trial court found that there had been substantial modification of the tractor and
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the design defect claim.' 0 Turning to
the failure to warn claim, the court noted that it was alleged "without much
specificity"' 02 but denied summary judgment, holding that there were issues of
material fact as to whether the plaintiff knew of the danger of the hood flying off its
hinges as a result of jet wash. 0 3 After a full trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff
damages in excess of $48 million.' 04
After posttrial motions, the trial court upheld the jury finding of failure to warn
on the grounds that the manufacturer of the baggage tractor knew that its tractors
could be used in various states of disrepair and that it had a duty to warn that the
hood, under pressure from jet wash, could invade the passenger compartment and
cause injury.105 The plaintiffs testimony that he would have heeded a warning had
it been given was sufficient to show causation. 06 On appeal to the Second Circuit,
the defendant argued that "plaintiffs' case was legally insufficient because . . .
plaintiffs were required to 'present expert proof regarding the feasibility, actual
content, form and placement of a proposed warning."'"0 7 The court rejected the
defendant's argument, concluding that a jury could understand the mechanism that
caused the injury as well as the need for a warning that under extreme pressure from
jet wash the hood would rotate into the passenger compartment of the tractor. 08
The failure of the court to require the plaintiff to suggest a RAW was crucial to
a determination of causation in this case. It is not clear whether a warning should
have been placed on the baggage tractor. Perhaps the warning should have been in
a user's manual. If the plaintiff had never looked at or read the user's manual, then
causation could not be established. Furthermore, the text of the warning would
have needed to indicate that the danger from jet wash arose when the other
component parts of the tractor were missing. The plaintiff was aware, in general, of
the dangers of jet wash; he claimed not to be aware, however, that without the
missing components the hood could enter the passenger compartment when
subjected to jet wash.1 09 How a warning could have been worded to account for this
contingency was never raised at trial. Moreover, any chance of determining
whether a proposed RAW would have prevented the plaintiff's harm would require
that such an alternative warning be identified. The court absolved the plaintiff of
his duty to offer such a warning as part of his prima facie case.1o
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id. at *9.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *9-11.
104. Saladino v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 500 F. App'x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2013).
105. Saladino v. Stewart & Stevenson Serys., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 237, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
106. Id.
107. Am. Airlines, Inc., 500 F. App'x at 72-73.
108. Id.
109. See Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-7644 (SLT)(JMA), 2007 WL
4285377, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007).
110. Other cases that did not require a RAW raise serious questions as to whether, if
specificity had been required, plaintiffs would have been able to survive a defense motion
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III. CASES REQUIRING A RAW To ESTABLISH SPECIFIC CAUSATION
A few courts have realized that without a RAW they are incapable of deciding
whether a plaintiff has established causation. In Cuntan v. Hitachi Koki USA,
Ltd.,"' an experienced carpenter was cutting plywood using a power saw
manufactured by the defendant. After he removed his finger from the saw's trigger
switch to deactivate its motor, the plaintiff set the saw down on a grass surface."l 2
According to the plaintiff, the saw continued to operate and it traveled several feet
across the ground.' 1 3 The saw came into contact with the plaintiffs left hand,
causing serious injury.11 4 The plaintiff alleged both design defect and failure to
warn.115 The court dismissed the design-defect claim because the plaintiff failed to
present expert testimony as to the availability of a RAD." 6 The court then dealt
with the plaintiffs claim that the warnings of the risks of an operating blade were
inadequate because "the warnings 'should have been prominently displayed on the
machine with warning labels in color with pictogram [sic] and other remarkable
language, color and print to make this danger obvious to the operator."" 17 The
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that even if it were to
credit the plaintiffs assertion that a different warning would have altered his
behavior, "he ha[d] failed to offer any alternatives for the jury to consider."" 8
In Koken v. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc.," 19 the insurer of a contractor and
subcontractor brought suit against Auburn Manufacturing, Inc. for $9 million in
damages after one of its fire blankets caught fire resulting in extensive damage to a
generator covered by the blanket.1 20 The heart of the case was that Auburn had not
for summary judgment or directed verdict. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby
Prods., Co., 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff did not have to provide a
RAW where the plaintiffs infant aspirated baby oil that had been transferred to another
bottle and suffered severe injury). But see Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiffs alleged
failure to warn when their sixteen-month-old child suffered brain damage after choking on
peanut butter, claiming that peanut butter should not be fed to children under four years old
but not suggesting the text, size, and placement of such a warning); Emery v. Federated
Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993) (denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgment where a two-year-old child choked on marshmallows and the plaintiff did not suggest
the text, size, or placement of a warning); Bryant v. Adams, 448 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff claimed that
a trampoline should have had multiple warnings of dangers to users, but did not supply specific
suggestions as to the text, size, and placement of such a warning); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson
Baby Prods., Co., 797 P.2d 527, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Reed, J., dissenting).
111. No. 06-CV-3898 (RRM)(CLP), 2009 WL 3334364 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009).
112. Id at *2.
113. Id
114. Id
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at*ll.
117. Id at * 16 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
118. Id. at *17.
119. 426 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2005).
120. The fire was quickly put out by a fire extinguisher, but the chemicals in the fire
extinguisher caused damage to the generator. Id. at 43.
252 [Vol. 90:237
FIXING FAILURE TO WARN
provided adequate warnings about the possible dangers of fire that might occur
with the use of its fire blankets. An Auburn fire blanket was used to cover plywood
that in turn covered the generator.1 21 While an employee was cutting a steel lug, a
molten slug fell on the fire blanket, which melted the blanket and precipitated a
fire.1 22 The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant Auburn.123 On appeal to the First Circuit, the plaintiff argued that "it was
not the plaintiffs obligation to articulate a particular suggested warning, but rather
the entire duty to warn question should ... be thrown to the jury."' 24 The court said
that this position "completely misunderstands the plaintiffs burden in a negligence
action. It is the plaintiff s burden to establish a duty to warn and to prove proximate
causation of loss resulting from the failure to warn."1 25
The court said that "[t]hankfully, the appellants have not rested on such a
completely unsupportable position"1 26 but rather the plaintiff offered four different
suggested warnings. One suggested warning was that the fire blanket was "1000
degrees rated." 27 The plaintiff argued that, had the blanket been so labeled, the
employee would have consulted his foreman.1 28 The court noted that there was no
testimony by the foreman as to what he would have done in response to the
employee's hypothetical inquiry. 2 9 Nor was there evidence that an ordinary
employee would have understood what the 1000-degree rating meant with regard to
its resistance to fire. 130 A second suggested warning was that the fire blanket was
"not suitable for horizontal capture of concentrated spatter and red-hot cut
pieces."1 3 ' Although such a warning would have been appropriate, the court once
again found no proximate cause because there was no evidence that there was
horizontal capture of concentrated spatter or red-hot cut pieces, or that molten slag
is the equivalent of concentrated spatter.' 32 The plaintiffs expert did suggest a third
possible warning, stating the blanket was "not appropriate for cutting
operations." 33 However, the expert's testimony supporting such a warning was
disqualified since he could not articulate any methodology for determining the
appropriateness of a 1000-degree rated fire blanket for particular operations.1 34
Once the court rejected the proposition that the plaintiff could simply allege that
a warning should have been given without articulating what the warning should
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Koken v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. CIV. 02-83-B-C, 2004 WL 2358194, at *1 (D. Me.
Oct. 15, 2004).
124. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc., 426 F.3d at 46.
125. Id. at 46-47.
126. Id. at 47.
127. Id. at 48.
128. Id. at 49.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 50-51.
133. Id. at 47.
134. The court held that the plaintiffs expert testimony did not meet the requirement for
reliability set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993). See Black & Veatch Construction, Inc., 426 F.3d at 47.
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have said, the plaintiff-insurer had to make its case based on specific articulated
warnings. Since the plaintiff was unable to prove that any of the suggested
warnings would have prevented the damage to the generator, the court was justified
in upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant."'
IV. THE RAW PROPOSAL
We come to our proposal informed by lessons learned from our experience as
reporters for the Restatement (Third). In recommending the appropriate test for
determining design defect in that project, we followed the majority position that
imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of proving a RAD rather than the minority
position that allows the plaintiff to recover by merely showing that the product's
design disappoints consumer expectations.' 36 We, like most courts, reject the latter
test as standardless, collapsing defect and causation into a single issue that a jury is
permitted to resolve intuitively based on amorphous consumer expectations.13 In
like fashion, allowing the plaintiff to allege failure to warn without specifically
setting forth the relevant details-the medium and, if written, the text, placement,
color, and size of the proposed warning-condones a cause of action without any
standard and allows a jury to intuit causation without being required to test its
finding against what a real-world warning would have said.
The Moran case discussed earlier illustrates the dilemma that drafters of
warnings invariably face.138 On the one hand, a warning in four-inch red letters on a
bottle of cologne that reads "FLAMMABLE" is not only ambiguous-it is
downright misleading. It surely is inappropriate to tell consumers that one should
not smoke in a room in which the cap has been removed from a cologne bottle. On
the other hand, a warning that says "Do Not Smoke While Applying Cologne to
Your Face. It Can Cause a Fire." is too narrowly focused. A narrowly focused
warning invites the defendant to argue that other kinds of conduct in which people
may engage are not mentioned. If this were a valid argument, the defendant would
be forced to set forth a laundry list of various scenarios that could lead to fire
hazards. The plaintiff should be required to offer an alternative warning with
135. For other cases supporting the thesis that causation may be difficult to establish when a
RAW is required, see, e.g., Laspesa v. Arrow Int'l, Inc., No. 07cvl2370-NG, 2009 WL
5217030 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2009); Watson v. Electrolux Prof 1 Outdoor Prods., Inc., No. 04-
11782-DPW, 2006 WL 2246416 (D. Mass. Aug. 4,2006); St. Laurent v. Metso Mineral Indus.,
Inc., No. CIV. 04-CV-14-SM, 2005 WL 2277058 (D.N.H. Sept. 13, 2005); Barban v. Rheem
Textile Sys., Inc., No. 01-CV-8475 (ILG), 2005 WL 387660 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2005); G.E.
Capital Corp. v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 01 Civ.1849 LAP, 2003 WL 21498901 (S.D.N.Y. July
1, 2003); Morgen v. Ford Motor Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2003).
136. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 5, at 1094-1106.
137. See OWEN, supra note 23, § 8.3; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 879-82 (1998);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay, Intuition and Technology in Product
Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 678-83 (2000).
138. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975), rev'g Moran v. Williams, 313
A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
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sufficient specificity to signal a fire risk in some circumstances and then to convince a
court or jury that such a warning would have avoided injury to the plaintiff.
We do not pretend that drafting warnings is an easy task, and we recognize that
fact patterns like Moran are particularly challenging. But the difficulties should not
be overstated. In many cases, plaintiffs will be able to construct RAWs that are
sufficiently credible so that a fact finder may conclude that the failures to warn
caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. We appreciate that courts faced with
Moran-like problems may be motivated to wink at the formal requisites of the law
that demand proof of defect and cause; as one of the authors has developed
elsewhere, what may actually be happening in some of these cases is that courts are
imposing a form of enterprise liability, in which risk-creating enterprises are held
strictly liable in tort for the harm their activities cause. 139 Liriano may also be such
a case.1 40 One can sympathize with Judge Calabresi's desire to compensate a young
man who suffered such a tragic injury. However, in doing so he tortured the law of
warning and causation beyond recognition. Allowing plaintiffs to reach juries in
these cases might be warranted under an enterprise liability rationale.141 Our point
here is that requiring a RAW would reveal why traditional failure-to-warn doctrine
is an inadequate vehicle by which to reach those outcomes.
It is not our contention that the plaintiff must allege a specific warning at the
pleading stage. No such requirement is imposed on plaintiffs in cases involving
design defects. However, analogous to a case based on design defect where the
plaintiff must, during discovery, set forth with some particularity the alternative
design that would have avoided or reduced the injury, so in a warning case the
plaintiff should be required to spell out the text, location, size, and mode of warning
(verbal or pictorial). Failure to provide the reasonable alternative design or warning
should allow the defendant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. In both the
design and warning situations, whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient detail for
the alternative design or warning calls for judicial discretion. If the trial judge finds
that adequate detail has been provided, the issue becomes one for the trier of fact.
Once the plaintiff sets forth the RAW, the defendant will likely argue that the
proposed warning would not have made a difference and that the plaintiff has not
proven specific causation. Furthermore, the defendant may argue that if the RAW
proffered by the plaintiff should have been given, a multiplicity of warnings of the
same risk level would have to be given as well. Thus, once the plaintiff must
articulate the RAW with some specificity, the defendant is in a position to support
the claim that the RAW would either have been ineffectual or would have spawned
a spate of warnings that would have created sensory overload and would have
rendered the suggested RAW practically useless.
139. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product
Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (2002) (arguing that courts
sometimes impose sensible forms of enterprise liability by stretching traditional doctrine
beyond its limits).
140. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999).
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Design-defect and failure-to-warn cases share the same structural elements. Just as
the defendant cannot defend a case premised on defective design without knowing
the specifics of how the plaintiff would redesign the product to make it safer, so with
regard to defective warnings the plaintiff cannot challenge the reasonableness of the
defendant's marketing or whether better warnings would have saved the plaintiff
from injury without knowing the specifics of the proposed warnings. No court would
accept as adequate a statement by the plaintiff that she has a general idea for a RAD,
and no court should accept a similar generalization for a RAW.
For understandable reasons, failure to warn is a doctrine that has tended to lack
rigor. It is altogether too easy to conclude that a product seller should have said
something more in order to alert a user or consumer about a risk. However, even
when one can establish that there was a failure to warn, tort law requires that the
omission be causally related to the plaintiffs injury. That many courts have
adopted a presumption that if a warning had been given it would have been
heeded1 42 does not resolve the causation problem identified in this Article. In
fairness, the defendant cannot rebut the heeding presumption unless the plaintiff
identifies the warning that should have been given. One of the authors suspects that
some form of enterprise liability may best describe the courts' reactions to the
difficulties described herein.1 43 But given the certainty that courts will continue to
apply a failure-to-warn analysis, we argue that the plaintiff should be required to
prove a RAW to establish a prima facie case. It is our hope that this Article will
serve as the beginning of a fruitful dialogue.
142. The first case to adopt a heeding presumption was Technical Chemical Co. v.
Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). Other states have followed suit. See, e.g., Nissen
Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d
710, 720 (N.J. 1993); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981);
Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974). Several
jurisdictions, however, have refused to adopt a heeding presumption. See, e.g., Latiolais v.
Merck & Co., No. CV 06-02208 MRP (JTLx), 2007 WL 5861354, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2007) (stating that no California court has adopted the heeding presumption); Lord v.
Sigueiros, No. CV 040243, 2006 WL 1510408, at *3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006);
Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200 (Mont. 1993); Rivera v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 209 P.3d 271, 274-75 (Nev. 2009).
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
256 [Vol. 90:237
